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THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1978:
VIOLATING PERSONAL RIGHTS FOR THE SAKE
OF THE TRIBE
CHRISTINE D. BAKEIs*

I.

INTRODUCTION

"To live under the American Constitution is the greatest
political privilege that was ever accorded to the human race."'
One of the promises of the American Constitution is that states
will not enforce any law that abridges a citizen's privileges.2 The
American Constitution also guarantees that states will not
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."' The American Constitution applies to "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States,"4 including
American Indians.
In the late seventies, the United States' Congress began
investigating child custody proceedings involving Indian children. These investigations culminated in Congress enacting the
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA).5 The ICWA purportedly concerns itself with the well-being of Indian tribes and children. Application of the ICWA, however, is denying parents of
Indian children the privilege of living under the Constitution.
In the United States, parents enjoy certain rights concerning
the upbringing of their children.6 Despite the American Constitution's promises, the ICWA requires states to treat parents of
children with Indian blood differently than they treat other parents. Parents of children with Indian blood are not afforded the
privilege of selecting their child's adoptive parents.7 Likewise,
*

Associate, Kasdorf, Lewis & Swietlik, S.C.; J.D., with honors, Order of

the Coif, 1994, Drake University Law School. Former Law Clerk to the
Honorable Marsha K. Ternus, Iowa Supreme Court.
1. RESPECTFULLY QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS REQUESTED FROM
THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 65 (Suzy Platt ed., 1989) (attributed to

Calvin Coolidge, the White House, Dec. 12, 1924).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Id.
Id.
25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994).
See infra notes 121-39 and accompanying text.

7.

See infra notes 140-57 and accompanying text.

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

544

[Vol. 10

they are not necessarily given a right to remain anonymous in an
adoption proceeding.8 Thus, when Congress enacted the ICWA
it took away personal liberties of men and women who have children with Indian blood.
The ICWA also demonstrates Congress' lack of respect for
parents of Indian children. In fact, one of the best examples of
such disrespect is the only ICWA case decided by the United
States Supreme Court.9 In MississippiBand of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, unwed parents who were expecting twins decided it
would be in the children's best interests to give them up for
adoption. The parents selected the Holyfields as the family they
wanted to adopt and raise their children.' Before the twins'
birth the mother arranged to have them at the Gulfport Memorial Hospital, some two hundred miles away from the reservation. 1 After the twins' birth, the parents consented to the
adoption, and an adoption decree was entered in the state
court.12

Two months later, however, the Indian tribe to which both
parents belonged moved the court to vacate the adoption decree
on the ground that under the ICWA exclusive jurisdiction was
vested in the tribal court. 3 The trial court, respecting the great
lengths that the twins' parents had gone to ensure that their children were born off the reservation and adopted by non-Indian
parents, denied the tribe's motion. 4 The Supreme Court, on
the other hand, disregarded the parents' wishes and found that
"[t]ribal jurisdiction under [the ICWA] was not meant to be
defeated by the actions of individual members of the tribe, for
Congress was concerned not solely about the interests of Indian
children and families, but also about the impact on the tribes
themselves."' The court further illustrated its disrespect for the
parents' choice by stating that "[p]ermitting individual members
of the tribe to avoid tribal exclusive jurisdiction by the simple
expedient of giving birth off the reservation would... nullify the
purpose the ICWA was intended to accomplish." 6 This display
See infra notes 158-75 and accompanying text.
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
10. Id. at 37.
11. Id.
8.

9.

12. Id. at 37-38.
13. Id. at 38.
14. In re B.B., 511 So. 2d 918, 921 (Miss. 1987), rev'd sub nom. Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
15. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 49.
16. Id. at 52.
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of disrespect for parents' wishes is not only disheartening, but
unconstitutional.
This Article begins by considering some of the historical
events that prompted Congress to enact the ICWA. Next, the
Article examines whether the ICWA is accomplishing its purpose
as stated by Congress. The Article then criticizes the ICWA as a
violation of several persons' equal protection rights. The Article
then argues that even if the ICWA is constitutional, because it is
being applied inconsistently, congressional or judicial direction
is needed. Finally, the Article offers a proposal to amend the
existing law so that it will achieve the purpose for which it was
enacted, without violating personal rights.
II.

HisTORIcAL BACKGROUND OF THE

ICWA

Native Americans have a lengthy history of experiencing
problems in preserving their cultural heritage. 7 Some believe
that a policy of destroying Indian culture and tribal integrity, by
removing Indian children from their families and tribal settings,
was set even before the country became a nation." In the nineteenth century, sending Indian children away to distant boarding
schools to "civilize" and educate them was customary in this
country. In this century, an even greater problem is the large
number of Indian children that are removed from their homes
for purposes of foster care and adoption.' 9
In 1978, after extended hearings over a number of years,
Congress responded to the recommendations of the American
Indian Review Commission and enacted the ICWA. ° Congress
made the following findings which formed the basis for the
enactment of the ICWA:
(3) that there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their
children and that the United States has a direct interest, as
17. Culture includes more than artifacts, language, and history, it also
includes the members of a tribe. Thus, as the size of the tribe dwindles, its
culture is threatened.
18. See Manuel P. Guerrero, Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: A Response to
the Threat to Indian Culture Caused By Foster and Adoptive Placements of Indian

Children, 7 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 51 (1979); Edward L. Thompson, ProtectingAbused
Children: A Judge's Perspective on Public Law Deprived Child Proceedings and the
Impact of the Indian Child Welfare Acts, 15 AM. INDIAN L. Ruv. 1, 10 (1990).
19. Studies done in 1969 and 1974 indicated that in states with large
Indian populations twenty-five to thirty-five percent of all Indian children were
separated from their families and placed in foster homes or institutions. H.R
REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at 9 (1978).
20. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994).
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trustee, in protecting Indian children who are members of
or are eligible for membership in an Indian tribe;
(4) that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families
are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their
children from them by nontribal public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high percentage of such children are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes
and institutions; and
(5) that the States.... have often failed to recognize the
essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural
and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and
families."
The ICWA is premised on the government's recognition of
Indian tribes as sovereign governments. As such, the tribes have
a vital interest in deciding whether Indian children should be
separated from their families. The ICWA presumes that protectchild's relationship to the tribe is in the child's
ing the Indian
22
best interest.
23
Under the ICWA, the tribe has, with a few exceptions,
exclusive jurisdiction over child custody proceedings where an
Indian child is residing or is domiciled on the reservation.2 4
Also, even when an Indian child is not residing or domiciled on a
reservation, the tribe still has a right to participate in any state
court action.25 In either case, parental rights may not be easily
terminated. However, when they are, section 1915 of the ICWA
addresses the adoptive placement of Indian children and provides that "a preference shall be given, in the absence of good
cause to the contrary, to a placement with (1) a member of the
of the Indian child's
child's extended family; (2) other members
26
tribe; or (3) other Indian families."
The ICWA provides that an "Indian child" is "any unmarried
person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of
an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian
tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian
21. Id. § 1901.
22. See id. § 1902; Chester County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Coleman, 372
S.E.2d 912, 914 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 399 S.E.2d 773 (S.C. 1990), cert.
denied, 500 U.S. 918 (1991).
23. The ICWA excludes from its coverage custody pursuant to divorce
and placements based upon criminal acts committed by juveniles. 25 U.S.C.
§ 1903(1) (1994).
24. Id. § 1911(a).

25. Id. § 1911(b).
26.

Id. § 1915(a).
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tribe."2 7 Using this definition a child need not be a part of a
traditional Indian family to come within the reach of the ICWA.
In fact, the child does not even have to be residing with his or
her parent who is a member of an Indian tribe. This definition is
so broadly framed that children who do not even know of their
Indian ancestry can be subject to the rules of the ICWA.
III.

Is

THE

ICWA SERVING ITS PURPOSE?

One author has described the ICWA as standards designed
to protect culturally differing child rearing practices. 8 In its official declaration of policy, Congress declares:
[I] t is the policy of this Nation to protect the best interests of
Indian children and to promote the stability and security ofIndian
tribes andfamilies by the establishment of minimum Federal

standards for the removal of Indian children from their
families and the placement of such children in foster or
adoptive homes ....'
One of the purposes of the ICWA is arguably to fulfill the policy
of this Nation. This Part questions whether the ICWA is promoting the policy of this Nation or working against it.
A.

Is the ICWA in the Children's Best Interests?

"[I] t is the policy of this Nation to protect the best interests
of Indian children ....

"'0

Although the ICWA has arguably

aided in the maintenance of numerous Indian families, the
ICWA does not necessarily "protect the best interests" of all
Indian children. "The goal of granting custody based on the best
interests of the child is indisputably a substantial governmental
interest.. .

.""

All children, regardless of their race, deserve to

be protected from abusive parents. Although it would ignore
reality to suggest that ethnic and racial prejudices have been
eliminated, such prejudices are impermissible considerations for
removal of a child from a parent,"2 and should not be a permissible consideration for placement of a child either.
Although some claim that "placement of an Indian child in
a non-Indian home is likely to result in severe psychological
27.

Id. § 1903(4).

28.

David Null, Note, In re Junious M.: The California Application of the

Indian Child Welfare Act, 8 J. Juv. L. 74, 74 (1984).

29.
30.
31.
32.

25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1994) (emphasis added).
Id.
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
Id.
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harm,""3 others disagree. Psychiatrists who testified at the congressional hearings claimed that Indian children were being
immersed in white culture without an opportunity to develop a
vital Indian identity.3 4 Testimony indicated that the lack of
Indian identity creates serious problems during adolescence,
because this is when Indian children begin experiencing racial
discrimination and dating taboos.3 5 This viewpoint has been
adopted by at least one justice in a reported opinion." Although
this may be true, a lack of reliable data on interracial adoptions
makes predictions regarding the potential harms to Indian children speculative at best.3 7 Furthermore, there are others who
argue that placement of an Indian child in a non-Indian home is
not harmful to the child.
Professor Elizabeth Bartholet reviewed studies undertaken
to assess how well transracial adoptions work from the adoptee's
viewpoint.3 " The studies assessed the adoptees' adjustment, selfesteem, racial identity, and integration into the adoptive family
as well as the community.3 9 She found that the research shows
with
astounding uniformity ...

transracial adoption [is] work-

ing well from the viewpoint of the children and the adoptive families involved. The children are doing well in terms
of such factors as achievement, adjustment, and selfesteem. They seem fully integrated in their families and
communities, yet have developed strong senses of racial
identity. They are doing well as compared to minority chil33.

Robert J. McCarthy, The Indian Child Welfare Act: In the Best Interests of

the Child and Tribe, 27 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 864, 870 (1993).
34. Indian Child Welfare Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian
Affairs on Problems that American IndianFamiliesFace in Raising Their Children and
How these ProblemsAre Affected by FederalAction or Inaction, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 45,

46 (1974) (statement of Dr.Joseph Westermeyer, Dept. of Psychiatry, University
of Minnesota).
35. Id.
36. See In re Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059, 1075 (Okla. 1985) (Kauger, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (finding that separation of Indian
children from their Indian culture robs them of their cultural heritage and is
detrimental to their later development), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1072 (1988).
37.

Margaret Howard, TransracialAdoptions: Analysis of the Best Interests

Standard,59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 503, 535-36 (1984).
38. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of
Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1163 (1991). Although Bartholet's
article deals primarily with black interracial adoptions, its findings are
applicable here as well.
39. Id.
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dren adopted inracially40and minority children raised by
their biological parents.
Bartholet's views are also supported by Kim Forde-Mazrui, David
Fanshel, and Joseph Westermeyer.4 1 Forde-Mazrui questioned
the wisdom of racial-matching policies and concluded that
"ignoring race when placing a [minority] child... would avoid
the concrete harms of current policies without subjecting the
child to substantiated risks."4 2 Fanshel's research suggests that
Indian children raised in non-Indian homes develop normally in
the cognitive and emotional areas.4" Finally, Westermeyer's
investigation revealed that Indian children raised in non-Indian
homes had secure Indian cultural identities when they had relationships with other Indian children." These results suggest that
although leaving a child with his or her natural parents is normally preferable, Indian children can develop normally in nonIndian homes. Thus, claims that placement of Indian children
in non-Indian homes is damaging to their well-being 4 5 may need
to be re-examined. Regardless of which camp is correct, the
ICWA is clearly harming Indian children in other ways. One
such example is the heightened standard of proof required by
the ICWA.
1.

Standard of Proof

In litigation, parties must take into account the margin of
error in fact-finding that is always present.4 6 "Standard of proof"
functions to instruct the fact-finder as to the degree of confidence society has decided the fact-finder should have in the correctness of its conclusions for the particular adjudication.4 7 In
proceedings to terminate parental rights, the Supreme Court has
held that before a state may sever the parent-child relationship,
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
40. Id. at 1209.
41. Michele K. Bennett, Comment, Native American Children: Caught In the
Web of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 16 HAMLINE L. REV. 953, 971 (1993); Kim
Forde-Mazrui, Note, Black Identity and Child Placement: The Best Interests of Black
and Biracial Children, 92 MICH. L. REv. 925 (1994); Joseph Westermeyer, The
Apple Syndrome in Minnesota: A Complication of Racial-Ethnic Discontinuity, 10 J.
OPERATIONAL PSYCHOL. 134 (1979).
42. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 41, at 955.
43. Bennett, supra note 41, at 971.

44.
45.
46.
357 U.S.
47.

Westermeyer, supra note 41, at 137-39.
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (quoting Speiser v. Randall,
513, 525-26 (1958)).
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754-55 (1982).
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that the state support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence.4"
The ICWA permits termination of parental rights only when
the evidence establishes, "beyond a reasonable doubt,"49 that
continued parental custody will cause the child serious emotional
or physical damage.5 ° Furthermore, the decision must be supported by the testimony of "qualified expert witnesses."5 1 These
standards clearly reject the "best interests of the child" standard
used by most states. In fact, the Bureau of Indian Affairs' Guidelines (Guidelines) state that "[a] child may not be removed simply because ... it would be 'in the best interests of the child' for
him or her to live with someone else .... It must be shown that
. . it is dangerous for the child to remain with his or her present
2

custodians."Although the Supreme Court has held that a child should
not be subject to adverse legal discrimination because of factors
beyond the child's control,53 such a result is occurring because of
the heightened standard of proof in ICWA abuse and neglect
termination cases.' For example, in In re NS.,55 a child, N.S.,
was born to a single Caucasian mother who was experiencing psychiatric problems. 6 Nine months after N.S. was born, the
mother was admitted to the psychiatric unit for the second
time.5 The mother was diagnosed as having alcohol addiction
problems and a borderline personality disorder.5 8 The Department of Social Services (DSS) was contacted after the mother
told her counselor that she feared that her brother would sexu48. Id. at 769.
49. The stringency of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is usually
reserved for criminal actions which deny a defendant liberty or life. See id. at
755. Under the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, society imposes the
entire risk of error upon itself. Id.
50. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (1994).
51. Id. § 1912(e)-(f).
52. Bureau of Indian Affairs Guidelines for State Courts: Indian Child
Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, 67,593 (Nov. 26, 1979) [hereinafter
Guidelines].
53. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968) (holding state
discrimination against illegitimate children unconstitutional).
54. See In re D.S., 577 N.E.2d 572, 575 (Ind. 1991); In re M.T.S., 489
N.W.2d 285, 288 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that Minnesota's best interest
of child standard was preempted by ICWA regardless of the fact that separation
from potentially adoptive parents would be painful for the child).
55. 474 N.W.2d 96 (S.D. 1991).
56. Id. at 97.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 98.
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ally abuse N.S.5 9 The DSS worked with N.S.'s mother for several
months, but eventually placed N.S. in foster care when the
mother stated she wanted to place N.S. for adoption.6 0 Because
the mother frequently changed her mind regarding the adoption, supervised visits were arranged. 6 1 During these visits, the
DSS caseworker noted the lack of bonding between N.S. and his
mother.6 2 She also discovered that N.S. had extreme behavior
problems and developmental delays. 63 The DSS caseworker
believed that N.S. had been abused and recommended extreme
caution in returning N.S. to his mother.' The court eventually
found N.S. to be an abused and neglected child, and terminated
his mother's parental rights under the state's clear and convincing burden of proof standard. 65 The mother appealed arguing
that because N.S. was one fourth Indian, the heightened standard of the ICWA should have been applied.6 6 On appeal, the
South Dakota Supreme Court found that even though N.S. was
not born into an Indian home and had never had contact with
his Indian relatives, the standards of the ICWA should have been
applied to the termination of his Caucasian mother's rights.6 7
Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court's termination and
remanded for findings consistent with the ICWA. 6
Thus, by creating a special federal standard of proof in
abuse and neglect termination cases, the government is potentially forcing children who lack ties with traditional Indian society to experience more abuse and neglect before the state can
take action on their behalf. Such a result is clearly not beneficial
to children with Indian ancestry.

59.

Id.

60.
61.

Id.
Id.

62. Id.
63.
64.

Id.
Id.

65.

Id. at 98-99. Under South Dakota law, the trial court must find "clear

and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights is in the child's
best interests and the state must show that there is no narrower means of
providing for the best interests and welfare of the child." Id. at 99, n.4 (citing In
reA.D., 416 N.W.2d 264 (S.D. 1987)).
66. Id. at 97. Under the ICWA, a parent's rights cannot be terminated
unless the court finds evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that continued
custody "is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child."
25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (1994).
67. In re N.S., 474 N.W.2d 96, 100 (S.D. 1991).
68.

Id.
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Adoptive Placement Preferences

The ICWA states a clear preference for placing children with
Indian blood with Indian families. Specifically, section 1915(a)
states:
In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State
law, a preference shall be given, in the absence of good
cause to the contrary, to a placement with (1) a member of
the child's extended family; (2) other members
of the
69
Indian child's tribe; or (3) other Indian families.
Because of these special requirements, "caseworkers and attorneys are sometimes reluctant to accept surrenders of, or terminate parental rights to, an Indian child."7 ° Often, this results in
Indian children languishing in foster care without permanency,
planning, or adoption.7 1 Furthermore, when employing placement preferences of the ICWA, courts may be forced to overlook
the child's best interests.
In In re S.E.G.,7 2 the foster parents of three Indian children
petitioned to adopt them. The foster parents were not Indians.'7
The trial court found that the children had bonded with the foster parents and needed stability in their lives.7 " The trial court
held that because the children needed stability in their lives and
an Indian adoptive home was not available, good cause to deviate
from the preferences expressed in the ICWA existed.7 5
The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed. The supreme
court found that good cause to place the children in a manner
inconsistent with the ICWA had not been established and
ordered the children to remain in foster care.7 6 Thus, although
a family who was willing to adopt all three siblings existed, the
children were forced to remain in foster care simply because they
were Indian children. Although such a result may be in the best
interests of the tribe, it is not in the children's best interests.
When two sets of parents who are willing to adopt Indian children exist, and one set is an Indian couple, it may be in the children's best interests to follow the preferences established by the
ICWA. However, when, after a diligent search, a willing Indian
69.
70.

25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1994).
Debra Ratterman Baker, Indian Child Welfare Act, 15 CHILDEN's LEGAL

RTS. J. 28, 28 (1995).
71. Id.
72. 521 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 935 (1995).
73. Id. at 359.
74. Id. at 360.
75. Id. at 361.
76. Id. at 366.
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family cannot be located, the children should not be forced to
wait in parentless limbo for the sake of the tribe.
Another example of a court enforcing the ICWA without
considering the children's best interests is Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield." As discussed in Part I, the United
States Supreme Court, without considering the parents' wishes or
the children's best interests, strictly interpreted the ICWA to give
the tribe exclusive jurisdiction regarding placement of the
twins.7 8 The Court did not consider the fact that at the time of
its decision, the twins had been in the Holyfields' custody for
over two years. Although the tribal court eventually exercised
good wisdom and allowed the Holyfields to adopt the twins,7 9 the
fact remains that the Supreme Court applied the ICWA without
any consideration for the bonding that had occurred between
the twins and the Holyfields or the children's need for stability.
Furthermore, the argument that the placement preferences
of the ICWA do not allow for consideration of the children's best
interests is also supported by the large number of courts creating
good cause to deviate from the ICWA's dictates.8" As discussed
in Part V.D.3 of this Article, many courts are disregarding the
ICWA's clear placement mandates using the good cause exception. Such a phenomenon clearly indicates that the children's
needs and interests must be considered.
Although Congress declared that our Nation's policy is "to
protect the best interests of Indian children,"8 the requirements
of the ICWA work against, rather than toward the promotion of
this policy. The heightened standard of proof that the ICWA
forces courts to apply when deciding a termination case may conceivably be forcing Indian children to experience more abuse
and neglect. Even if these children are removed from the abusive setting in a timely manner, the standards of the ICWA
require them to remain in a state of parentless limbo longer than
other children in the same situation. Such outcomes are clearly
not promoting Congress' goal of protecting Indian children.
Furthermore, the ICWA is likewise ineffective in aiding tribes.

77.
78.
79.
1, 24.
80.
81.

490 U.S. 30 (1989). See supra notes 9-16 and accompanying text.
Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 52.
Marcia Coyle, After the Gavel Comes Down, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 25, 1991, at
See infra notes 262-305 and accompanying text.
25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1994).
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Is the ICWA Being Used by and Aiding Tribes?

According to RobertJ. McCarthy, director of the Indian Law
Unit of Idaho Legal Aid Services, the ICWA is not having the
impact Congress desired.8 2 McCarthy reported that according to
the Bureau of Indian Affairs:
[T] he ICWA [has] not reduced the flow of Indian children
into foster or adoptive homes. In fact, while the number of
children of all races in substitute care decreased in the
1980s, the number of Indian children in care increased by
25 percent.... Although 63 percent of all Indian child
foster placements are in homes in which at least one parent is Indian, less than half of placements made under
state jurisdiction are in Indian homes.8"
Although this may be true, one must ask if these statistics are
in part the result of the tribe's failure to get involved. The ICWA
provides that:
An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any
State over child custody proceeding involving an Indian
child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation of
such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is otherwise
vested in the State by existing Federal law. Where an
Indian child is a ward of a tribal court, the Indian tribe
shall retain exclusive jurisdiction, notwithstanding the residence or domicile of the child.84
It also provides that in "any State court proceeding for the foster
care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian
child.., the Indian child's tribe [has] a right to intervene at any
point."" Furthermore, the ICWA orders State courts to transfer
foster care placement and termination of parental rights cases
involving Indian children not domiciled or residing on an Indian
reservation to tribal court absent one of the following situations:
(1) "good cause" to the contrary; (2) objection by either parent;
or (3) "declination by the tribal court of such tribe." 6 Thus,
tribes are provided ample means of getting involved in cases
involving Indian children. Despite this fact, tribes often fail to
get involved.
82. See McCarthy, supra note 33.

83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 864.
25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1994).
Id. § 1911(c).
Id. § 1911(b).

1996]

INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1978

In a surprisingly high number of reported cases, although

the tribe was given notice, the tribe chose not to intervene. 87 If,

as Congress stated, "there is no resource that is more vital to the
continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children,"8 8 why are such a high number of tribes not getting
involved? Although one could understand a tribe's hesitation to
get involved in jurisdictions clearly recognizing the existing
Indian family exception," a majority of the cases where tribes
failed to get involved are from jurisdictions clearly rejecting the
existing Indian family exception.
For example, in In re Bird Head,9" the trial court notified the
Oglala Sioux Tribe's prosecutor that one of its children was
involved in a neglected and dependent proceeding.9" On the
date of the adjudicatory hearing, no one appeared on the tribe's
behalf.9 2 Despite this fact, the trial court found that the child
involved was an Indian child and continued the matter to allow
the child's tribe to request a transfer of jurisdiction to tribal
court.9" Although someone from the tribe did file a petition for
a change of venue, a tribal representative did not show up to
argue the petition at the hearing.9 4 Throughout the trial level
proceedings and the appeals, the tribe failed to appeal the
court's decision to retain jurisdiction.9 5
87. In re Stiarwalt, 546 N.E.2d 44 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989), appeal denied, 550
N.E.2d 564 (Ill. 1990); In reD.S., 577 N.E.2d 572, 573 (Ind. 1991); In reB.M.,
532 N.W.2d 504, 505 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995); In reS.M., 508 N.W.2d 732, 733 n.1
(Iowa Ct. App. 1993); In re L.N.W., 457 N.W.2d 17, 18 n.2 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990);
In re H.D., 729 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Kan. Ct. App. 1986); In reJohanson, 402
N.W.2d 13,16 n.1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); In re C.E.H., 837 S.W.2d 947,951 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1992); In re M.E.M., 725 P.2d 212, 213 (Mont. 1986); In re R.W., 509
N.W.2d 237, 239 (Neb. Ct. App. 1993); In re Bird Head, 331 N.W.2d 785, 788
(Neb. 1983); B.R.T. v. Exec. Director of the Soc. Serv. Bd., 391 N.W.2d 594, 595
(N.D. 1986); In re Child of Indian Heritage, 529 A.2d 1009, 1013 (NJ. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1987), aff'd, 543 A.2d 925 (NJ. 1988); In reR.N., 757 P.2d 1333,
1335 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988); In reS.C., 833 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Okla. 1992); In re
Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1072 (1988); In re
K.L.R.F., 515 A.2d 33 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), appeal dismissed, 533 A.2d 708 (Pa.
1987); In re Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485, 488 (S.D. 1990); In re B.R.B., 381 N.W.2d
283, 284 (S.D. 1986).
88. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (1994).
89. See infra notes 179-207 and accompanying text.
90. 331 N.W.2d 785 (Neb. 1983).
91. Id. at 787.
92. Id. at 788.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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The same lack of interest is exhibited in In re Maricopa
County Juvenile Action No. JS-8287.96 In Maricopa County, the trial

court notified the Pueblo Indian tribe that one of its children was
involved in a dependency case.9 7 The tribe did not get
involved.9 8 The court, however, continued to notify the tribe of
all proceedings that took place over the next two years. 99 The
tribe remained uninvolved. Once the foster parents petitioned
to adopt the child, however, the tribe suddenly had an interest in
the child.1" 0 The tribe disregarded the fact that the child had
bonded with the foster-adoptive family during the two years that
she had been with them, and petitioned the court to transfer
jurisdiction of the proceeding to the tribal court. 1 ' If this child
was such a "valuable resource," why did the tribe wait for over two
years before getting involved in her life? At least one commentator blames tardy and sporadic tribal participation in state court
ICWA proceedings on tribes' limited financial and technical
resources. 0 2 Others imply that a lack of comprehensive training
for both state and tribal social workers is partially to blame.'
Also, when tribes do get involved they do not always assert
the ICWA's clear placement preferences. For example, after taking the case all the way to the United States Supreme Court, the
tribal court involved in the Holyfield case allowed the non-Indian
mother to adopt the twins.1" 4 Similarly, the tribe responsible for
crossing several state lines to gain custody of the Keetso child"0 5
eventually awarded permanent custody to the non-Indian parents.1 0 6 Although such decisions show the tribes' ability to recognize the importance of a child's bonding to those who care for it,
these cases also reveal the tribes' willingness to release their "valuable resources."
96.
97.

828 P.2d 1245 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 1246.

98. Id. ("[T] he Pueblo still was consideringpetitioning for transfer to tribal
court .... " (emphasis added)).

99. Id.
100. Id. at 1246-47.
101. Id. at 1250.
102. Patrice Kunesh, Building Strong, Stable Indian Communities Through the
Indian Child Welfare Act, 27 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 753, 757 (1993).
103. Joseph A. Myers et al., Adoption of Native American Children and the
Indian Child Welfare Act, 18 ST. CT. J. 17, 25 (1994).
104. Coyle, supra note 79, at 24.
105. See infra notes 140-47 and accompanying text.
106. Todd J. Gilman, Baby Given to Couple by Navajo Court, LA. TIMES,
Sept. 1, 1988, § 1, at 25.
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:, -. Finally, although tribal utilization of the ICWA is unclear,
one thing is clear: the ICWA is not aiding tribes.' °7 Alaska is the
only state that has reported the number of adoptions and out-ofhome placements since the enactment of the ICWA. Out-ofhome placements of Alaska Native children, who are considered
Indian children under the ICWA, "have significantly increased
since the passage of the ICWA." 1°8 The testimony of the spokesperson for Alaska Federation of Natives is illustrative:
In 1987, 8 years after the passage of the Indian Child
Welfare Act, the problems which the Act tried to rectify
have worsened in the State of Alaska. The 1976 survey
done by the Association on American Indian Affairs which
ultimately led to the. enactment of the Indian Child Welfare Act found that there was an estimated 393 Alaska
Native children in State and Federal out-of-home placement. In 1986 that figure has risen to 1,010, which represents a 256-percent increase. During the same period of
time, the total population of Alaska Native children
increased by only 18 percent.
As the figures indicate, the removal of our children
from our homes and culture continues at a rate that far
in Alaska continue
exceeds our population. The problems
09
to worsen for Native children.'
Although no other states have reported the number of Indian
adoptions since the passage of the ICWA, it is doubtful that it is
achieving the desired effect.
IV.

EQUAL

PROTECTION VIOLATIONS

All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
l

laws. 10
107. Myers et al., supra note 103, at 25.
108. Id.
109. OversightHearings on the Indian Child Welfare Act: Hearingbefore the U.S.
Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1987).
110. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
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The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to protect the
rights of individuals against classifications based on race.'1 1 The
United States Supreme Court has stated that "[cilassifying persons according to their race is more likely to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate public concerns; the race, not the person,
'
This statement appropriately describes
dictates the category." 112
the ICWA because the blood ties, or race of the child, dictates
whether the ICWA applies. The ICWA does not consider
whether a child with the appropriate amount of Indian blood is
living with an Indian parent. Likewise, the ICWA does not consider whether the child is living, or has ever lived on an Indian
reservation, or in an Indian community. The sole guiding factor
is race. Thus, the ICWA can not be reconciled with the Fourteenth Amendment's guiding principle.
As early as 1879 this country recognized that a person born
with Indian blood could avoid the reach of the federal Indian
power by severing his or her tribal ties and assimilating into society."' In United States v. Crook, twenty-five Ponca Indians filed a
writ of habeas corpus seeking release from their confinement on
a reservation.' 4 The court found that an Indian had a "Godgiven right to withdraw from his tribe and forever live away from
it, as though it had no further existence."' 15 Although this case
has never been overruled, persons with Indian blood no longer
have the right to act as though they have never belonged to a
tribe.
In 1978, Congress, by enacting the ICWA, went against past
Supreme Court decisions 6 and did specifically what the Constitution prohibits States from doing. Whereas States are not permitted to treat citizens differently, Congress disregarded the
Fourteenth Amendment and enacted the ICWA, authorizing all
States to treat parents of children with Indian blood differently.
By so doing, Congress is effectively denying these parents their
111. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) ("A core purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with all governmentally imposed
discrimination based on race." (citation omitted)).

112. Id.
113. See United States v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695 (C.C.D. Neb. 1879) (No.
14,891).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 699.
116. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that Virginia
statute preventing marriages between persons soley on the basis of racial
classifications could not stand); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954)
(striking down a Texas law which discriminated against Mexican-Americans in
jury selection); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (striking down a
West Virginia law that only permitted white males to serve as jurors).
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"liberty" and "property"11 7 rights without the process afforded to

all other citizens. This continues today despite the Supreme
Court's statement in 1981 that "neither Congress nor a State can
validate a law that denies the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." 118
The modem rule controlling equal protection analysis of
national legislation on Indian affairs was set out by the Court in
Morton v. Mancari.119 In Morton, the articulated standard was
close to a rational basis test:
As long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to
the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the
Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed.
Here, where the preference is reasonable and rationally
designed to further Indian self-government, we cannot
say
1 20
that Congress' classification violates due process.
The ICWA violates the standard set forth by the Court in at least
two ways which are discussed below. However, before examining
how parental rights are being violated by the ICWA, it is important to understand what rights parents have in regard to their
children generally.
A.

Parental Rights

1. Background of Parents' Rights Historically
Constitutional law scholar Gerald Gunther has written that
the Supreme Court has "occasionally protected aspects of liberty
even though they were not explicitly designated in the Constitution. "121 One of these rights is parental rights. Throughout most
of history parents have been given a right to raise their child as
they see fit. In Europe,
when one was either a Catholic or a Jew . .. St. Thomas

argue[d] that: it would be an injustice to Jews if their children were to be baptized against their will, since they
would lose their rights of parental authority
over their chil22
dren as soon as they were Christians.'
117. Although the Author does not believe that children should be
treated as property, their treatment in this country is similar to property in
some respects.
118. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 732-33 (1982).
119. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
120. Id. at 555. Since United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977), the
Court has not decided any significant Indian equal protection cases.
121. GERALD GuNTHER, CONsrrTrUTIONAL LAW 492 (12th ed. 1991).
122. Raphael T. Waters, The Basis for the Traditional Rights and
Responsibilities of Parents, in PARENTAL RIGHrs: THE CONTEMPORARY ASSAULT ON
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Likewise, the United States has traditionally upheld parents'
rights to control the future of their children.12
The philosophical basis for parental rights have been
described by one commentator as follows:
Discovery of the order natural to the family and natural to civil society depends on a prior discovery of the
nature of man and its essential properties. We are morally
free about many things with the social order; for example,
we are free about who we will marry, which society we shall
live in, and who will govern our societies, as well as a host
of other things. But there are other matters about which
we are not morally free, and these have to be determined
by an adequate study of the nature of each of the social
bodies: the domestic and political societies most notably.
Those who wish to impose an order based on the arbitrary decision of some minority, or even some majority,
threaten the peace and freedom of every member of civil
society. Above all, under such a social order, a few might
temporarily find human happiness, but most members
would discover what earlier civilizations found to their
great regret, namely, that to live counter to that order best
established by nature alone involves enormous cost in
human terms.
The enemies of the domestic society demand conformity whereby each person becomes an individual citizen
existing solely for the sake of the welfare of the political
group to which the family belongs. Although these enemies see the domestic unit standing in their way, human
offspring need the family. They ought to be reared in love
of the goods most fitting to their natures as persons since,
as such, they have a value of their own and not as mere
individuals disposable for the good of the social whole.
Of what does education of the young consist? It is
movement towards the acquisition of the intellectual and
TRADITIONAL LIBERTIES 13,
eds., 1988).

29 (Stephen M. Kranson & Robert J. D'Agostino

123. Thompson, supra note 18, at 5 ("Parents have
fundamental interest in the care, custody, and control of
Derived from common law, the care, custody, and control of
fundamental interest protected by . . . the United States

a natural and
their children.
one's child is a
and Oklahoma

Constitutions."); Stan Watts, Note, Voluntary Adoptions Under the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978: Balancing the Interests of Children, Families, and Tribes, 63 S.

CAL. L. REV. 213, 247 (1989) ("Parents have the authority to make many
important decisions affecting their children. . . . [H]istorically this parental
power has been virtually unconstrained ....").
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moral virtues so that the child may become all that he
ought to be and capable of all that he ought to do. The
parents alone are sufficient guardians of this for their own
child. Therefore, they alone have inalienable rights
to
124
develop that child to the perfection of full humanity.
Based upon these beliefs, the Constitutional Framers, without
explicitly mentioning parental rights, implicitly deemed parents
to have rights concerning their children's upbringing when they
drafted the Constitution. 125 Scholars all agree that "matters
touching on natural parent-child relationships... are fundamental liberty and privacy interests protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment."'1 6 This is evidenced by the fact that courts have
long recognized "a constitutionally protected parental right to
care and custody of children under the Fourteenth Amendment."1 27 Courts have gone so far as to state: "The right to
direct the upbringing of one's child 'is one of the most basic of
all civil liberties.' ,128
More specifically, this country has consistently upheld parents' rights to direct their children's education and religion, as
well as their right to discipline their child.'2 9 The United States
Supreme Court has frequently emphasized that parents' rights
to control their children's futures have been deemed " 'essential,' 'basic civil rights of man' and '[r] ights far more precious...
than property rights.' "I"
In 1923, the Supreme Court first held that a parent has a
right to control his or her child's education. 31 Two years later,
the Court reaffirmed this stance by stating that parents have a
124.

Waters, supra note 122, at 37-38.

125. Thomas J. Marzen, Parental Rights and the Life Issues, in PARENrAL
supra note
122, at 44, 51.
126. Marian L. Faupel, The "Baby Jessica Case" and the Claimed Conflict
Between Children's and Parents' Rights, 40 WAYNE L. REv. 285, 289 (1994). See also
GuNTHER, supra note 121, at 492; Marzen, supra note 125, at 54; Thompson,
supra note 18, at 5.
127. Marzen, supra note 125, at 54.
128. In re K.LJ., 813 P.2d 276, 279 (Alaska 1991) (quoting Flores v.
Flores, 598 P.2d 893, 895 (Alaska 1979)).
129. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (upholding parents'
right to educate their children); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
(upholding Amish parents' right to educate their children according to their
religious beliefs); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 147 (1965) ("A parent is
privileged to apply such reasonable force or to impose such reasonable
confinement upon his child as he reasonably believes to be necessary for its
proper control, training, or education.").
130. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (citations omitted).
131. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400.
RIGHTS: THE CONTEMPORARY ASSAULT ON TRADrrIONAL LIBERTIES,
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liberty right "to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control."112 In Pierce the Court balanced the right of
parents to educate and raise their children against the state's
interest in a homogeneous population, and found the parents'
rights were more vital."' 3 The Court stated that a "child is not
the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct
his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."1" 4 The Court
again reaffirmed parents' right to control their child's future in
Wisconsin v. Yoder."3 5 In Yoder the Court found that "[t]o be sure,
the power of the parent.... may be subject to limitation ... if it

appears that parental decision will jeopardize the health or safety
of the child,""3 6 but permitted Amish families to remove their
children from formal education after the eighth grade. Finally,
American parents are also given a liberty right to discipline their
children as they see fit.'3 7
Parents maintain most of these rights even when they give
their child up for adoption. In Dickens v. Ernesto, the New York
Court of Appeals upheld a statute which allowed parents to
express their preference that their child be raised in the religion
of their choice, even though they were giving the child up for
adoption.'
The court found that a statute which granted birth
parents the right to specify the religious affiliation of prospective
did not violate the United States or New York
adoptive parents
139
Constitutions.
132.
133.

Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
Id.

134.

Id. at 535.

135. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
136.

Id. at 233-34.

137.

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF TORTS § 147 (1965).

Obviously, this

discipline must be reasonable and must not harm the child. What is reasonable
is determined by each state's law.
138. Dickens v. Ernesto, 281 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y.) (giving considerable
weight to the wishes of the natural parents), cert. dismissed, 407 U.S. 917 (1972).
139. Id. at 156-57. New York is not the only state that considers the birth
parents wishes regarding the religious affiliation of the adopting parents.
Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Ohio have also considered the birth
parents' wishes when making adoption decisions. See Cooper v. Hinrichs, 140
N.E.2d 293 (Ill. 1957) (considering natural parents' wishes regarding the
religious upbringing of their child); Frantum v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 133 A.2d
408 (Md.) (refusing to grant adoption where Catholic birth mother expressed
desire for child to be raised a Catholic and child was placed with a Lutheran
family), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 882 (1957); Purinton v. Jamrock, 80 N.E. 802
(Mass. 1907) (considering natural parents' wishes regarding the religious
upbringing of their child); In re Doe, 167 N.E.2d 396 (Ohio Juv. Ct. 1956)

(same).
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When Congress enacted the ICWA it not only gave Indian
tribes broader power to control the removal of its children, but
also took away personal liberties of men and women who have a
child with Indian blood. Thus, Congress effectively created two
classes of parents: parents of children with Indian blood and all
other parents. Under current law, a parent's rights vary depending upon the class to which they belong.
2. Examples of How Parents of Indian Children Rights Vary
from Everyone Else's Rights
a. Selection of Adoptive Parents
In today's media hyped world, all Americans are aware of
the fact that birth parents may choose the parents who will adopt
and raise their child. Depending on the circumstances, it is not
uncommon for the adoptive parents to pay for the birth mother's
medical expenses and be present while she is giving birth.
Although the right to choose who will adopt and raise a child is
not a right enunciated in the Constitution, it is one that all Americans take for granted. It is also, unfortunately, a right which the
ICWA took away from parents of children with Indian blood.
In 1987 Ms. Patricia Keetso, a Navajo woman, decided to
give up her child for adoption."4 She answered an advertisement in an Arizona newspaper and met the prospective adoptive
couple, Mr. and Mrs. Richard Pitts.1"' After staying with the Pitts
for several months, Keetso formed a close bond with the adoptive
couple.1 42 Mrs. Pitts even coached Keetso during labor and was
present when the baby was delivered.' 4 3
Some time after the child's birth, tribal authorities contacted the child's grandmother who was living on a reservation."

According to a newspaper account:

Keetso [the grandmother] said that tribal authorities had
frightened her .

.

. into helping them spirit 8-month-old

Allyssa Kristian Keetso from her natural mother, Patricia
Keetso, and from the baby's would-be adoptive parents,
Cheryl and Rick Pitts ....

Keetso and tribal authorities

took possession of the baby during a televised airport
drama ....

After they arrived in Arizona for a child cus-

tody hearing, the grandmother said that tribal authorities
took the child away from her on Friday. Keetso said she
140. Joan Smith, It Was a Setup, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 17, 1988, at Al.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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believes the baby is in the custody of a Navajo social
worker, but does not know exactly where. 145
The Navajo tribe never permitted the Pitts to adopt the
Keetso baby, despite the natural mother's desire for them to do
so."
Unfortunately, this scenario is not an isolated one. 47 The
Keetso case is just one example of how Indian parents are not
allowed to exercise the same rights as every other citizen of this
country. If Patricia Keetso was not an Indian, such action would
have never been permitted and the Pitts would have adopted her
baby, as she desired.
For example, in Kasper v. Nordfelt, the Utah Court of Appeals
held that a mother's choice to place her child with an adoption
agency should not be disregarded simply because the paternal
grandparents want to raise the child. 4 s In Kasper, the court
found that:
Although the Wilson court opined that under some circumstances family relationships might be of such a nature that
[grandparents'] application to adopt should be given consideration .... we do not find such a circumstance here,
where the only living parent of the child deliberately and

thoughtfully decided to place the child for adoption with
an agency, and not with the paternal grandparents. We
think the integrity of such a decision, involving a critically
important parental right, must be preserved, not only for
the stability and well-being of the child, but also for49the
protection of the adoption process and its purposes.'
Other courts across the nation have made rulings consistent with
Kasper when faced with a similar situation. 5 0
145. Id.
146. Navajo Baby is Home For Good in San Jose, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 24, 1988,
at B3.
147. The attorney for the Navajos claimed the Navajo Nation is involved
in seventy-five similar cases throughout the country. Smith, supra note 140, at
Al.
148. Kasper v. Nordfelt, 815 P.2d 747, 749 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
149. Id. at 747.
150. Hayes v. Watkins, 295 S.E.2d 556, 557 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (holding
that grandparents do not have a right to intervene in adoption proceeding
where at least one natural parent is alive and has consented); In re Benavidez,
367 N.E.2d 971, 974 (111. App. Ct. 1977) (finding that wishes of mother giving
consent to nonrelative adoption should "legitimately be taken into account"
because grandparents have no legal right to be preferred over adoptive
parents); In re B.B.M., 514 N.W.2d 425, 429 (Iowa 1994) (allowing
"grandparents to intervene where parents have voluntarily placed their child
for an independent adoption . . . would be to elevate the grandparents'
interests above the interests of the parents"); Christian Placement Serv. v.
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In the Keetso case, Kathy Youngbear, a representative of the
American Indian Center, argued that the Navajo tribe had the
right to the return of the child:
While Anglo culture holds parental rights sacred, Indians
also value the rights of the extended family and the tribe.
The Indian Child Welfare Act allows the tribe to intervene
in adoption cases even against a mother's wishes .... The

reporting has been through the eyes of a white couple
whose poor baby is being taken away from them. In actuality it should be from an Indian woman's point of view: this
baby's rights as a Navajo baby, a Navajo tribal member and
a Navajo woman. These Indian kids are our future
leaders. 151
What Youngbear, and many supporters of the ICWA fail to recognize is that by common law, all Americans, regardless of their
cultural background, have certain parental rights;15 2 rights which
the ICWA has effectively taken away from parents of Indian children.' 5 3 Although Youngbear correctly argued that the Keetso
case should have been viewed from an Indian woman's point of
view, she missed the point. Both Youngbear and the Navajo tribe
completely disregarded Keetso's wishes. Keetso was not forced to
put her baby up for adoption and she did not make' a rash decision to do so. Keetso made a thoughtful and deliberate choice to
place her child with a non-Indian family. Under the ICWA, however, her wishes meant nothing. Therefore, the Navajo tribe did
not have to consider, let alone honor, her decision to remove the
child from the Indian culture.
American law states that a parent has the right to determine
what is best for their child, and the community does not have a
right to question that decision if the child is not directly harmed
by it. 5 4 The Supreme Court has found that legislation dealing
with Indians does not violate equal protection principles so "long
as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment
Gordon, 697 P.2d 148, 155 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that grandmother

may not intervene where only living parent had consented to adoption through
an agency); In re Peter L., 453 N.E.2d 480, 482 (N.Y. 1983) (finding that
recognizing right of grandmother to adopt grandchild where mother

voluntarily surrendered the child to an agency for adoption would undermine
the mother's decision).
151. Smith, supra note 140, at Al.

152. See supra notes 121-39 and accompanying text.
153. "Tribal jurisdiction under [the ICWA] was not meant to be defeated
by the actions of individual members of the tribe . . . ." Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 49 (1989).
154. See generally supra notes 121-39 and accompanying text.
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of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians."155 Congress
enacted the ICWA "to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes
and families."'" 6 At least one court has acknowledged that the
ICWA "is an intrusion on [a] mother's ability to determine what
is in the best interests of her child."15 7 Because this intrusion can
not be rationally tied to protecting the best interests of the child
nor preserving the Indian family, the ICWA is unconstitutional.
b. Anonymity
Although adoption is more prevalent and accepted today
than it was in the past, giving a child up for adoption remains a
rather taboo topic in the American society. This fact is recognized by permitting birth mothers and fathers to remain anonymous until the child turns eighteen. Furthermore, an everincreasing number of teenage girls are faced with unplanned
pregnancies. In such a situation, courts have recognized that not
all teens can turn to their families."5 8 When Congress enacted
the ICWA it chose to disregard this fact. Under the ICWA, parents of children with Indian blood can be forced to tell their
families of the birth to ensure compliance with the ICWA's placement preferences. An example of this is In re Baby Girl Doe." 9
In Baby Girl Doe, the Montana Supreme Court held that a
tribe's right to enforce statutory preferences for adoptive placement of an Indian child prevailed over the mother's statutorily
recognized interest in anonymity.' 60 In Baby Girl Doe, the baby
girl's mother expressed her intention to relinquish her parental
rights shortly after the birth.' 6 ' After the statutorily required
period of time, the mother filed an affidavit waiving all parental
rights and consenting to an adoption without further notice.' 62
In her affidavit, the mother indicated that she had been advised
of the ICWA, "but for privacy reasons wished to remain anonymous and requested that the court not contact her family or
155. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974).
156. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1994).
157. In re Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925, 930 (N.J. 1988).
158. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (holding
unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute that required either parental or court
consent before a minor may have an abortion).
159.

865 P.2d 1090 (Mont. 1993).

160. Id. at 1095.
161. Id. at 1090. The mother did not have a specific family picked to
adopt her daughter, but clearly expressed her intent to give her daughter to the
Department of Family Services for adoptive placement. Id.
162. Id. at 1091.
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Tribe concerning placement." 6 ' The district court concluded
that the mother's relinquishment was knowingly and freely given
and that the temporary order for protective services should
remain in effect until the child was placed for adoption."M The
court also notified the Chippewa Cree Tribe that
a child eligible
1 65
for enrollment had been placed for adoption.
The Tribe moved to intervene and requested information
regarding the identity of the mother and her family.1 6 6 Because
the Tribe's request conflicted with the mother's request for anonymity, the court ordered a hearing.1 67 After considering both
parties' arguments the court concluded that the mother's right
to anonymity outweighed the Tribe's interest in enforcing the
statutory preferences for adoption. 68
The Tribe appealed this order.169 The Montana Supreme
Court, relying on Holyfield, stated that the principle purposes of
the ICWA were to "promote the stability and security of Indian
tribes by preventing further loss of their children."1 7 Therefore,
the court found that giving "primary importance to the mother's
request for anonymity would defeat the Tribe's right to meaningful intervention and possibly defeat application of the clear preference provided by statute for placement of [the child] with a
member of her extended family."' 7 1
This case is yet another example of how the ICWA permits a
tribe to completely disregard the parents' wishes and constitutional rights. 7 Americans would be outraged if all parents were
forced to give up their right to privacy in this situation. Unplanned pregnancies remain such a taboo topic in this country that
in most states even minors are permitted to have an abortion
without their parents knowing. 73 Yet, because of the ICWA, the
mother in Baby Girl Doe could have been forced to have her family find out not only that she was pregnant but that she had given
birth and given the child up for adoption. All other American
163.

Id. The mother also appeared in court and averred the same. Id.

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1092.
Id.
Id.

170.
171.

Id. at 1095.
Id.

172. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (A woman's right
to privacy was clearly set forth by Justice Blackmun in Roe v. Wade when he
stated that the right of privacy is "broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.").
173. See generally Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
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parents' request for anonymity would be honored-Indian parents' request should also be.
The ICWA permits tribes and courts to blatantly disregard a
natural parent's deliberate and thoughtful decision to have their
child adopted by a specific family of their choice. Even more
frightening is the fact that under the ICWA courts and tribes can
disregard a parent's conscious decision not to have their child
raised in the same social setting to which they belong. Economically poor parents would likely be applauded if they placed their
child for adoption with a financially stable, educated family in
hopes of giving the child what they could not. The ICWA does
not allow parents of children with Indian blood to do the same.
Parents of children with Indian blood can not decide that they
do not want their child to grow up on a reservation and place
their child for adoption off of a reservation without the tribe's
consent. 174 Courts have found that parents have certain constitutional rights regarding the upbringing of their children. One of
these rights is the right to anonymously place the child for adoption with the family of their choice.'7 5 Because the ICWA effectively eliminates those rights for a specific class, parents of
children with Indian blood, without any rational tie to Congress'
obligation to the Indians, the ICWA is unconstitutional. Furthermore, and more importantly, the ICWA is violating the rights of
the innocent children involved.
B.

Neglected and Abused Indian Children

The race classification created by the ICWA is harming
Indian children in two ways. First, as previously discussed in Part
III.A.1. of this Article, most states use "clear and convincing evidence" as their standard of proof in termination of parental
rights cases. The ICWA, however, uses the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard of proof in termination of parental rights cases.
This elevated standard of proof is potentially causing Indian children to endure more neglect and abuse for the sake of their
tribe's future.
Furthermore, once this heightened standard of proof has
been satisfied, Indian children may be forced to remain in an
abusive setting longer than children of other racial backgrounds
because of concern regarding the mixing of children with parents - be they foster or adoptive - of a different race. As previously discussed in Part III.A. of this Article, experts disagree on
174.
(1989).
175.

Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 52
Kasper v. Nordfelt, 815 P.2d 747, 747 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

1996]

INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1978

the question of whether placement of Indian children in nonIndian homes is harmful to their mental well-being. Regardless
of what experts think, the fact is that the ICWA mandates that:
In any foster care ... placement, a preference shall be
given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a
placement with(i) a member of the Indian child's extended family;
(ii) a foster home licensed, approved, or specified by
the Indian child's tribe;
(iii) an Indian foster home licensed or approved by
an authorized non-Indian licensing authority; or
(iv) an institution for children approved by an Indian
tribe or operated by an Indian organization which has a
program suitable to meet the Indian child's needs.' 7 6
Thus, when it becomes clear that a child should no longer
remain in an abusive setting, the child will either remain in that
setting until a placement which satisfies the mandates of the
ICWA is available, or be moved from one foster care setting to
another when a placement which satisfies the ICWA is open.
Both options are equally unpalatable.
The United States Supreme Court has held that children
should not be subjected to adverse legal discrimination because
of factors beyond their control. 177 The race of a child's parents
and the culture into which a child is born is clearly a factor
beyond a child's control. The high standard imposed by the
ICWA is denying Indian children equal protection under the law.
Thus, the ICWA is arguably violating the rights of parents and
children. However, even if the Supreme Court were to somehow
justify the classifications and unequal treatment of the ICWA, the
Court would have to recognize and deal with the inconsistent
application of the Act.
V.

Is THE

ICWA

BEING APPLIED CONSISTENTLY?

C. Steven Hager, a staff attorney with Oklahoma Indian
Legal Services, wrote that " [i]f Holyfield stands for anything, it is
that the states cannot create their own definitions for the
ICWA." 178 Six years after Holyfield, the only Supreme Court opinion to address the law set forth in the ICWA, state courts have
176. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (1994).
177. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968) (holding discrimination
against illegitimate children unconstitutional).
178. C. Steven Hager, ProdigalSon: The "Existing IndianFamily" Exception
to the Indian Child Welfare Act, 27 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 874, 879 (1993) (citing
Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 42-54).
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continued creating their own definitions for several of the terms
contained in the ICWA. This is significant for two reasons. First,
it indicates that the ICWA is not being applied consistently. Second, it signifies that the language of the ICWA is anything but
clear, and the inconsistent application will continue until the
United States Supreme Court rules on emerging definitions, or
Congress amends the ICWA with more explicit definitions.
A.

The Existing Family Exception

In 1982, the Supreme Court of Kansas created what is commonly known as the existing Indian family exception. 179 Baby
Boy L. was the illegitimate son of a non-Indian mother, and a
five-eighths Kiowa Indian father, Carmon Perciado. i s° On the
day of Baby Boy L.'s birth, his mother executed a consent to
adoption which was limited to the adoptive parents named
therein."' On the same day, the adoptive parents filed a petition for adoption. 18 2 The court granted the adoptive parents
temporary custody of Baby Boy L. and served notice of the adoption proceeding on Perciado at the Kansas State Industrial
Reformatory."' 3 Perciado answered the adoption petition
requesting that he be found a fit parent, that his parental rights
not be severed, and that he be given permanent custody of his
son. 184
At trial, the court found that because Perciado was 1an5
enrolled member of the Kiowa Tribe, the ICWA might apply.
Therefore, the court continued the trial to allow notice to be
provided to the Kiowa Tribe.'
The Kiowa Tribe responded by
filing petitions to intervene, to change temporary custody, and to
transfer jurisdiction. 18 7 The Kiowa Tribe also enrolled Baby Boy
L. as a member of the tribe against the express wishes of his
mother. 8 8 After finding that the ICWA did not apply, and that
Perciado was an unfit parent, the trial court granted the adoption of Baby Boy L. to the adoptive parents.89
179. In re Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Kiowa
Tribe v. Lewis, 777 F.2d 587 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 872 (1986).

180.

Id. at 172.

181.
182.

Id.
Id.

183.

Id.

184.
185.

Id. at 173.
Id.

186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 173-74.
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The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the ICWA did not apply to this case. 190 In making its
decision, the Kansas Supreme Court considered the legislative
history and the language of the ICWA. 19 ' The court found that
Congress intended to maintain existing family relationships and
concluded that Congress did not intend to "dictate that an illegitimate infant who has never been a member of an Indian home or
culture, and probably never would be, should be removed from
its primary cultural heritage and placed in an Indian environment over the express objections of its non-Indian mother." 192
The court found that the underlying thread which runs throughout the ICWA is the concern with the removal of Indian children
from an existing family unit and the resultant breakup of the
Indian family. 9 3 Since the Kansas Supreme Court's holding in
Baby Boy L., other states have considered its reasoning with varying degrees of support.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Holyfield, nine state
appellate courts considered using the reasoning set forth by the
Kansas Supreme Court in Baby Boy L.'9 4 Of the nine, four
adopted the existing family exception and five rejected it. 95
Although Holyfield purportedly implicitly overruled the existing
Indian family exception, 9 6 states continue to apply the excep190. Id. at 174.
191. Id. at 175 (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901(4), 1911(a), 1912(d)-(f), 1914,
1916(b), 1920, 1922 (1978)).

192. Id.
193. Id.
194. The jurisdictions rejecting the reasoning of Baby Boy L., do so mainly
because of their belief that the plain meaning of the statute does not require
the exception. See In re N.S., 474 N.W.2d 96, 101 n.6 (S.D. 1991) (Sabers, J.,

concurring) ("There is simply no statutory requirement for [a child] to have
been born into an Indian home or an Indian community in order to come
within the provisions of [the] ICWA, however much one might believe 25
U.S.C. § 1903(4) should have been written that way. No amount of probing into

what Congress 'intended' can alter what Congress said, in plain English ....
").
Others have found that a mother and child constitute an "Indian family." In re
D.S., 577 N.E.2d 572, 574 (Ind. 1991).

195. Indiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, and South Dakota adopted the
existing family exception. See In re T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298 (Ind. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1069 (1989); In reS.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986);
In re Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059, 1064 (Okla. 1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1072
(1988); Claymore v. Serr, 405 N.W.2d 650 (S.D. 1987). Arizona, California,

NewJersey, Utah, and Washington rejected the existing family exception. See In
re Coconino County Juvenile Action No. J-10175, 736 P.2d 829 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1987); In reJunious M., 193 Cal. Rptr. 40 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); In re Child of
Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1988); In re Halloway, 732 P.2d 962 (Utah

1986); In re S.B.R., 719 P.2d 154 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
196. Hager, supra note 178, at 882.
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tion today. In fact, after Holyfield, some states changed their
the existing family exception which it
prior holdings to recognize
19 7
had previously rejected.
For example, prior to Holyfield the Washington Court of
Appeals rejected the existing family exception.19 In 1992, however, the Washington Supreme Court refused to apply the ICWA
absent an existing Indian family. 9 ' In Crews, a mother who had
Indian bloodlines, but was not a member of a tribe, voluntarily
gave her child up for adoption.20 0 After the adoption was final,
the mother sought to become a member of the Choctaw Nation
for the express purpose of invoking the ICWA to secure her
child's return.2" 1 The Washington Supreme Court found that an
"Indian family" did not exist at the time the mother surrendered
the child for adoption because she was not a member of a recognized tribe at that time.202 Therefore, the concurrence noted,
the child was not an "Indian child" under the Act at the time of
adoption. 2°9 Although the Washington Supreme Court stated
that its holding in Crews is limited to "the narrow circumstances
presented by the facts of this case," the fact remains that the
court is willing to use the exception in certain situations.20 4
Washington is just one of the states that has refused to apply the
ICWA absent an existing Indian family. As it currently stands,
Alabama, California, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, and Oklahoma
also recognize the existing Indian family exception to the
ICWA. 2°5 Thus, the Supreme Court's decision in Holyfield did
not decrease the number of states applying the existing Indian
family exception to the ICWA.
Until the Supreme Court or Congress decides whether the
ICWA was meant to apply to children who are not a part of an
existing Indian family, states will continue to apply the ICWA discordantly. Unfortunately, it does not appear that either the
197. Both California and Washington rejected the existing family
exception before Holyfield, but currently accept it. See infra notes 198-205 and
accompanying text.
198. In re S.B.R., 719 P.2d at 154.
199. In re Crews, 825 P.2d 305, 307 (Wash. 1992).
200. Id.

201. Id.
202. Id. at 310.
203. Id. at 312-13 (Andersen, J., concurring).
204. Id. at 311.
205. See S.A. v. EJ.P., 571 So. 2d 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990); In re Lindsay
C., 280 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); In re Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 175
(Kan. 1982); Barbry v. Dauzat, 576 So. 2d 1013 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 578
So. 2d 136 (La. 1991); In reSA.M., 703 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); In re
S.C., 833 P.2d 1249, 1254-55 (Okla. 1992).
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Supreme Court or Congress will resolve the issue of the existing
Indian family exception to the ICWA anytime soon. In June of
1993, a child's would-be adoptive parents appealed to the
Supreme Court suggesting that a division existed in the states
regarding the existing Indian family exception and asking the
Court to rule on the validity of the exception.2 0 6 The Court,
however, declined to grant certiorari.2" 7 Thus, a person's rights,
or lack thereof, will continue to vary, depending on which state is
interpreting Holyfield's application to the ICWA.
B.

Determining when the Right to Revoke Voluntary Consent
to Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption
Ends
The ICWA provides:
In any voluntary proceeding for termination of parental
rights to, or adoptive placement of, an Indian child, the
consent of the parent may be withdrawn for any reason at
any time prior to the entry of a final decree of termination
may be, and the child shall be
or adoption, as the case
20
returned to the parent.

This section of the ICWA has been interpreted in two very distinct ways. Some courts find that termination and adoption proceedings are two distinct proceedings; therefore when a final
decree of termination is entered, the parent is not entitled to
revoke their consent before the adoption decree is entered.20 9
Other jurisdictions, however, permit that parents of an Indian
child may revoke their consent at any time prior to the final
adoption° decree, whether or not a final decree of termination
2
exists. 1

The majority of the jurisdictions addressing this issue have
held that a parent's right to withdraw their voluntary consent
expires when the final order terminating parental rights is
206.

Swenson v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 62 U.S.L.W. 3119 (U.S. June 14,

1993) (No. 93-18) (petition for cert. filed).
207. Swenson v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 114 S. Ct. 173 (1993).
208. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(c) (1994).
209. In reJ.R.S., 690 P.2d 10 (Alaska 1984); In reKiogima, 472 N.W.2d 13
(Mich. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1064 (1992); B.R.T. v. Exec.
Director of Soc. Servs. Bd., 391 N.W.2d 594, 599 (N.D. 1986); In re Crews, 825
P.2d 305, 311 (Wash. 1992).
210. In rePima CountyJuvenile Action No. S-903, 635 P.2d 187 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982); In re K.L.R.F., 515 A.2d 33 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1986), appeal dismissed, 533 A.2d 708 (Pa. 1987).
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entered. 2" In Kiogima, the mother of three Indian children contacted DSS and told them that she wanted to release her children
for adoption.2 1 2 Four days later, at a hearing held to execute a
release of her parental rights, the mother appeared with her
attorney and signed the release.2 13 A final order terminating the
mother's parental rights was entered the same day.2 14 Before the
order was entered, however, the court informed the mother that
"she had a right to request a rehearing within [twenty] days or to
appeal within [twenty-one] days after an order was entered termiOver six months later, the
nating her parental rights. 2 1 5
mother petitioned the court to set aside the order of termination, arguing that pursuant to the ICWA she had an unqualified
right to revoke her release at any time prior to adoption. 2 16 The
Michigan Court of Appeals adopted the reasoning of the
supreme courts of Alaska and Nebraska and held that the
mother's right to withdraw her consent expired twenty-one days
after the final order terminating her rights was entered. 7 The
court quoted with approval, the Alaska Supreme Court's explanation that section 1913(c) applies to two types of consent: "a consent to termination of parental rights or a consent to adoptive
placement. "218 The court went on to say that:
A consent to termination may be withdrawn at any time
before a final decree of termination is entered; a consent
to adoption at anytime before a final decree of adoption.
If Congress had intended consents to termination to be
revocable at any time before entry of a final decree of
adoption, the words "as the case may be" would not appear
in the statute.2 19
A minority ofjurisdictions disagree with the Alaska Supreme
Court's line of reasoning. 2 20 For example, in In re KL.R.F., the
211. Five states have addressed this issue: Alaska, Arizona, Michigan,
North Dakota, and Pennsylvania. Of the five, three have held that a parent's
right to withdraw their voluntary consent expires when the final order
terminating parental rights is entered. In reJ.R.S., 690 P.2d at 10; In re Kiogima,
472 N.W.2d at 13; B.RT., 391 N.W.2d at 599.
212. In re Kiogima, 472 N.W.2d at 13.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 14.
216. Id. at 13-14.
217. Id. at 15-16.
218. Id. at 15 (quoting In reJ.R.S., 690 P.2d 10, 13 (Alaska 1984)).
219. In reJ.R.S., 690 P.2d at 14.
220. In re Pima CountyJuvenile Action No. S-903, 635 P.2d 187 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982); In re K.L.R.F., 515 A.2d 33 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1986), appeal dismissed, 533 A.2d 708 (Pa. 1987).
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court found that because Pennsylvania law "establishes that consent to adoption may be withdrawn at any time before the entry
of the final decree of adoption,"221 the mother could withdraw
her consent even though her parental rights had already been
terminated. The Pennsylvania court approvingly quoted the Arizona Court of Appeals' statement that "[w] hen an Indian child
within the purview of the Act is involved, adoption agencies and
prospective adoptive parents must be held to assume the risk that
a parent such as appellant
might change her mind before the
22 2
adoption is finalized."

The two interpretations of section 1913(c) are creating
unnecessary stress for all parties involved in an adoption proceeding regarding an Indian child. The prospective adoptive
parents are forced to wait in nervous anticipation, praying that
the natural parent who consented to termination of their parental rights will not revoke their consent before a final adoption
decree is ordered. At the same time, in a different state, a natural parent may be heartbroken upon discovering that when they
consented to termination of their parental rights they effectively
consented to the adoption-despite the ICWA's promise of the
right to withdraw their consent "for any reason" prior to the
entry of a final decree of adoption. Until the Supreme Court
rules on the propriety of the two distinct interpretations of section 1913(c), adoptive parents, natural parents, and the children
involved will continue to suffer from the variance. Such a result
is unwarranted.
C.

Determining who is an Indian

Before the terms of the ICWA will be applied, the child
whose placement is at issue must be an "Indian child." The
ICWA does not apply merely because the children are
"Indian."2"' The ICWA applies only when there is evidence
establishing that the child is an "Indian child" as defined in the
act.22 4 An "Indian child" is defined as "any unmarried person
who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an
Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe
225
and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe."
221. 515 A.2d at 37.
222. Id. at 38 (quoting In re Pima CountyJuvenile Action No. S-903, 635
P.2d at 192).
223. In re Stiarwalt, 546 N.E.2d 44, 47 (111. App. Ct. 1989), appeal denied,
550 N.E.2d 44 (Il. 1990).

224. Id. at 48.
225. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (1994).
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The ICWA, however, contains no definition of membership in an
Indian tribe.
Under the ICWA each Indian tribe has sole authority to
determine its membership criteria, and to decide who meets
those criteria.2 2 6 Formal membership requirements differ from
tribe to tribe, as does each tribe's method of keeping track of its
own membership. 227 For example, the Yankton Sioux Tribe
requires applicants be one-fourth Indian and of that one-fourth,
one must be one-eighth Yankton Sioux. 228

Furthermore, the

remaining one-eighth must be Indian blood of a federally recognized tribe. 2 9 Thus, when a woman whose father was a fullblooded Ponca Indian and whose mother was one-half Yankton
Sioux and one-half Caucasian, attempted to enroll her children
(whose father was Caucasian), the Yankton Sioux rejected the
application because the Ponca tribe had been dissolved and
therefore her23 0 children did not meet the tribe's blood
requirements.
Tribes may also have various methods of keeping track of
their members. There is no one method of proving tribal membership. Thus, courts are permitted to make this determination
as they see fit. The Guidelines, however, state that
[e] nrollment is not always required in order to be a member of a tribe. Some tribes do not have written rolls.
Others have rolls that list only persons that were members
as of a certain date. Enrollment is the common evidentiary
means of establishing Indian status, but is not the only
means nor is it necessarily determinative.23 1
Despite the Guidelines, some jurisdictions implicitly require
2s2 while others do not.2 3 Some courts accept testienrollment,
of the tribal government as probative
mony of a representative
226. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n.32 (1978); In re
B.W., 454 N.W.2d 437, 446 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) ("[I]t is essential to the

purposes of the ICWA to allow appropriate tribal authorities to determine these
matters according to tribal law, customs and mores best known to them.").
227. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 72 n.32.
228. In reJ.L.M., 451 N.W.2d 377, 384 (Neb. 1990).
229. Id. at 385.
230. Id. at 384-85.
231.

Guidelines, supra note 52, at 67,586.

232. In re Baby Boy W., 831 P.2d 643, 647 (Okla. 1992); In re Quinn, 881
P.2d 795, 801 (Or. 1994) (finding that the child was not an Indian child
because neither father nor child was an enrolled member of an Indian tribe
when the mother consented to the child's adoption); In re Hunter, 888 P.2d
124, 125-26 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (same); In reB.R.B., 381 N.W.2d 283, 284 (S.D.
1986) (refusing to accept mother's claim that she was a member of the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe).
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evidence of membership.2 " 4 Others reject affidavits stating that a
person is a member of the tribe."' For example, some courts
require an unwed Indian father to acknowledge and establish
paternity before declaring the child an Indian child. In In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. A-25525,"36 the Caucasian mother
was uncertain of the paternity of her child, but told the adoption
agency that it might be the child of an Indian.2" 7 Edmund Jackson, an Indian tribe member, was contacted and told that he
could be the baby's father.2 3 Jackson went to see the baby but
did not acknowledge paternity. 39 The adoption agency later
filed a petition to terminate Jackson's parental rights alleging
Jackson 24had
abandoned the child.2 4 ° The petition was
1
granted.

Over a year later, Jackson's tribe moved to intervene in the
adoption proceeding.2 42 The tribe alleged that the court had
failed to comply with the ICWA placement preferences, claiming
that the child was an Indian child.2 43 Six days later Jackson
acknowledged his paternity of the child.244 The trial court found
that the tribe's, as well as the father's, interest came too late, and
concluded that good cause to deviate from the ICWA placement
preferences existed because the child had been with the adoptive
mother for almost three years.24 5
On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals first questioned
whether the baby was an Indian child.24 6 The court found that
the trial court should not have applied the ICWA unless evidence
established that the child was indeed an Indian child. 247 The
court held that because the ICWA's definition of "parent" does
233. In
requirement
eligibility for
child."), cert.

re Baby Boy Doe, 849 P.2d 925, 930 (Idaho) ("There is no
that a tribe must make a conclusive determination of a child's
membership in the tribe as proof that the child is an Indian
denied sub nom. Swenson v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 114 S. Ct. 173

(1993).
234. In reJ.L.M., 451 N.W.2d at 387; In reAngus, 655 P.2d 208, 212 (Or.
Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 830 (1983).
235. In re Quinn, 881 P.2d at 801.
236. 667 P.2d 228 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
237. Id. at 230.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 231.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 232.
247. Id. at 232-33.
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not include unwed fathers who fail to acknowledge and establish
paternity, the trial court should not have applied the ICWA.24 s
This same line of reasoning has been used in other states as
well.24 9 For example, in In re Baby Boy D., a seventeen-year-old
non-Indian female was pregnant with a nineteen-year-old Indian
male's child.2 5 ° The male knew that the female was pregnant
with his child but did not make any effort to assist the mother in
any way. 251 The mother told the father that she intended to give
the baby up for adoption, and the father did not object.2

52

Two

months after the child was born, however, the father filed suit
claiming
his rights should not have been terminated under the
ICWA. 253
The court found that although the father was a registered
Indian, the child was not an Indian child because the father had
not acknowledged or attempted to establish paternity. 25 4 Thus,
in Arizona and Oklahoma, having a child with Indian blood is
meaningless until and unless the father acknowledges
paternity.

255

On the other hand, some jurisdictions have found that
regardless of any acknowledgement of paternity, if a child has
Indian blood, it is an Indian child under the ICWA.25 6 In In re
N.S., the father never acknowledged paternity in any way, but
because the mother told the court that the baby's father was onefourth Indian, the court found that N.S. was an Indian child.2 5 7
Courts are also inconsistent in decisions regarding when a
parent must enroll in an Indian tribe to invoke the ICWA. In In
re H.D., 5 8 the mother did not apply for tribal membership until
a court date for termination of her parental rights had been set.
Although the tribe did enroll her as a member, this enrollment
occurred after the court had terminated her parental rights.25 9
248.
249.

Id.
SA. v. E.J.P., 571 So. 2d 1187, 1189-90 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990); In re

Child of Indian Heritage, 529 A.2d 1009, 1014 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987),
aff'd, 543 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1988); In re Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059, 1064 (Okla.

1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1072 (1988).
250. In re Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d at 1061.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1064.
255. Id.; In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. A-25525, 667 P.2d

228, 232-33 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
256.
257.
258.
259.

See In re N.S., 474 N.W.2d 96, 98-99 (S.D. 1991).
Id. at 99.
729 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Kan. Ct. App. 1986).
Id.
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Nonetheless, on appeal, the court found that the children were
indeed Indian children to whom the ICWA applied even though
their mother was not an enrolled member of the tribe when the
case was heard.260 In contrast, in In re Johanson,26 ' when the
mother enrolled herself and her son in the Cherokee nation
after the order terminating her parental rights was entered, the
court held that the fact that the child had "Indian heritage" during the proceedings did not qualify him as an Indian child under
the ICWA.
Once again, application of the ICWA relies not on objective
factors, but on each state's subjective interpretation of it. Deciding who is an Indian, a decision which should be simple, varies
depending only on the jurisdiction deciding the case. Such a
result is clearly unconstitutional. However, until Congress, or
the Supreme Court, produces some guidelines as to what is or is
not necessary to establish eligibility for tribal membership, due
process rights will continue to be violated.
D.

Determining when "Good Cause" to Deviate from the
ICWA Exists

The ICWA provides that:
In any state court proceeding for the foster care placement
of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child not
domiciled or residing within the reservation of the Indian
child's tribe, the court, in the absence of good cause to the con-

trary, shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of
the tribe .....26

It also provides that:
In any [foster care, preadoptive placement, or] adoptive
placement of an Indian child under State law, a preference
shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a

placement with (1) a member of the child's extended family; (2) other members of the Indian child's tribe; or (3)
other Indian families.26 3
The ICWA does not define the term "good cause." Therefore, courts are permitted to look to other sources for guidance
in making the "good cause" determination. What constitutes
"good cause" is unique to the individual facts of each case. Not
260.

Id. at 1241.

261. 402 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
262. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
263. Id. § 1915(a) (emphasis added). Subsection (b) enumerates four
placement preferences to be given "in the absence of good cause to the
contrary" when foster care or preadoptive care is at issue. Id. § 1915(b).
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surprisingly, courts across the nation are applying different standards when making a "good cause" determination. State courts
are also reaching opposite results in cases that are virtually identical factually. Thus, whether "good cause" to deviate exists may
be less than a factual decision depending on the jurisdiction
hearing the case.
1. Standard of Proof in Making a "Good Cause"
Determination
The ICWA is silent regarding the standard of proof courts
should apply when making a "good cause" determination. Thus
courts are forced to resolve the issue by attempting to discern
legislative intent.2" Traditionally, legislative silence on standard
of proof is viewed as an intention that the preponderance of the
evidence standard should be applied.2 6 The only case to
squarely address this issue, however, chose not to apply the preponderance of the evidence standard. 2" Instead, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals found that "good cause" to deviate from adoption placement preferences of the ICWA need only be proven by
clear and convincing evidence.2 67 However, other jurisdictions
have, without discussing their reasons for so doing, applied the
preponderance of the evidence standard to a "good cause"
26
finding.
2.

"Good Cause" not to Transfer Jurisdiction
The core of the ICWA is its jurisdictional provisions over
child custody proceedings.2 6 9 Indian tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian
child who resides or is domiciled on the tribe's reservation.2 7 ° In
cases where the child does not reside on the reservation, however, the state court exercises concurrent jurisdiction with the
tribal court.2 71 Nevertheless, the ICWA grants Indian tribes the
264.

Steadman v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 450 U.S. 91, 95-96 & n.10

(1981).
265. Cf Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (preponderance of
the evidence standard applied when Congress is silent, unless " 'particular
important individual interests or rights are at stake' " (quoting Herman &
MacClean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389-90 (1983))).
266. In re S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d 872, 878 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd on
other grounds, 521 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 935 (1995).

267.
268.
269.
270.

Id.
In re N.P.S., 868 P.2d 934, 936 (Alaska 1994).
In reJ.L.P., 870 P.2d 1252, 1256 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1994).

271. Id. Once a petition to transfer to tribal court is filed, the state court
should hold a hearing on the petition. In re G.L.O.C., 668 P.2d 235, 236-38
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privilege of presumptive jurisdiction over nondomicilary Indian
children2 72 and provides a procedure for transferring cases from
state court to tribal court.2 73 Once a petition to transfer jurisdiction to the tribal court has been received, the state court must
transfer the case unless (1) the tribal court declines transfer, (2)
either parent objects to the transfer, or (3) the court finds there
is "good cause" to retain the case. 27 4 Because the ICWA is silent
regarding the meaning of "good cause" as it is used in section
1911 (b), courts are free to make their own decisions.
The Guidelines provide that "good cause" exists if the
Indian child's tribe does not have a tribal court as defined by the
ICWA. 275 "Good cause" also exists, under the Guidelines, when
the state court proceeding is at an advanced state.2 76 Furthermore, "good cause" exists when an Indian child over the age of
twelve objects to the transfer.2 77 Finally, the Guidelines provide
that "good cause" exists when an Indian child is over the age of
five, the child's parents are unavailable, and the child has had
little or no contact with his or her tribe.2 78
Courts also turn to the ICWA's legislative history when
deciding if "good cause" exists. The ICWA's legislative history
indicates that the "good cause" exception was formulated to
allow state courts to apply a "modified doctrine of forum non
conveniens." 2 79 Thus, state courts are permitted to decide
whether the tribal court is a less convenient forum. Courts across
the United States often use the doctrine of forum non conveniens
to find good cause not to transfer a case to tribal court. 8 ° When
making a good cause determination based on forum non conveniens considerations, courts sometimes consider, "the practical
(Mont. 1983). At the hearing, the party opposing the transfer has the burden
of establishing that good cause not to transfer exists. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b)

(1994).
272. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1994); In reT.R.M., 489 N.E.2d 156, 158 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1986) ("[Plurpose of Congress in the ICWA is clear that questions
concerning the adoption of and termination of parental rights to Indian
children must be deferred to tribal determination .... "), rev d 525 N.E.2d 298

(Ind. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1069 (1989).
273.

25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1994).

274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. H.R. RP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at 21 (1978).
280. See, e.g., In reJ.R.H., 358 N.W.2d 311 (Iowa 1984); In reJ.W., 528
N.W.2d 657, 661 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995); In re Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 178
(Kan. 1982); In re Birdhead, 331 N.W.2d 785, 790 (Neb. 1983); In re R.N., 757
P.2d 1333, 1336 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988); In re N.L., 754 P.2d 863 (Okla. 1988).
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factors that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive, such as the relative ease of access to sources of proof, the
cost of obtaining the attendance of witnesses, and the ability to
secure attendance of witnesses through compulsory process. "281
In In re N.L.,2 82 a mother was attempting to transfer the proceedings from the state court of Okmulgee County, Oklahoma,
to the tribal court which was located in Kay County,
Oklahoma. 2 3 The mother was residing in Oklahoma County,
Oklahoma, but all of the necessary witnesses and the child were
residing in Okmulgee County.2 84 The court found that the presence of the witnesses and the child in Okmulgee County constituted "good cause" to deny the transfer to the tribal court.28 5
State courts have also created their own definitions of what
constitutes "good cause." Although the United States Supreme
Court has stated that " [i]t is not ours to say whether the trauma
that might result from removing these children from their adoptive family should outweigh the interests of the Tribe," 286 at least
two state courts continue to use the "best interests of the child"
test in finding good cause not to transfer jurisdiction to a tribal
court.987 On the other hand, two other states have clearly
rejected applying the "best interest of the child" standard when
making good cause to transfer decisions. 2 8 Arizona and South
Carolina have found that "good cause" exists when a tribe does
not have a mechanism for handling child custody matters.28 9
South Carolina has also stated that "good cause" exists when
there is evidence establishing that removing the children "would
be disruptive and detrimental to their best interests."" ° Still
281.
282.
283.
284.
,285.

In re R.N., 757 P.2d at 1336.
754 P.2d at 863.
Id.
Id.
Id.

286. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 49
(1989).
287. In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-8287, 828 P.2d 1245,
1251 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); In reT.S., 801 P.2d 77, 80 (Mont. 1990), cert. denied,
500 U.S. 917 (1991).
288. In re Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060, 1065-66 (111. App. Ct.), appeal denied,
555 N.E.2d 374 (Il.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 940 (1990); In re C.E.H., 837 S.W.2d
947, 954 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).

289. In re Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-903, 635 P.2d 187 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982); Chester County Dep't of Soc.
Servs. v. Coleman, 372 S.E.2d 912, 914 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 399 S.E.2d
773 (S.C. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 918 (1991).
290. Chester County, 372 S.E.2d at 915. In Chester County, the children lived
in South Carolina, but the tribal court seeking jurisdiction was located in South

Dakota. Id. at 913.
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other jurisdictions refuse to find "good cause" even when the
child is in the state's jurisdiction at the parents' request.2 91 Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah, have held that when a child is born
on a reservation, the reservation retains jurisdiction even if the
child was voluntarily taken off the reservation for adoption, and
has not been on the reservation for over two years.2 92 Finally,
Arizona and California have found that "good cause" exists when
a tribe waits an unreasonable amount of time before
intervening. 9 3
3. "Good Cause" to Deviate from Foster Care and Adoptive
Placement Preferences
The ICWA is also silent regarding the definition of "good
cause" as it is used in section 1915(a) and (b). Thus, courts are
permitted to make their own decisions. Some find guidance in
the Guidelines which provide that in adoptive proceedings, a
determination of "good cause" not to follow the order of preference mandated in the ICWA shall be based on any one or more
of the following considerations:
(i) The request of the biological parents or the child
when the child is of sufficient age.
(ii) The extraordinary physical or emotional needs of
the child as established by testimony of a qualified expert
witness.
(iii) The unavailability of suitable families for placement
after a diligent search has been29 4completed for families
meeting the preference criteria.
However, the Guidelines are not regulations and therefore are
neither controlling or binding on a state court's decision.2 9 5
Thus, courts do not always follow them and have even added several other factors to their determination of "good cause." 29 6 For
291. In re Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-903, 635 P.2d at 187; In re
Baby Child, 700 P.2d 198, 200 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985); In re Halloway, 732 P.2d

962 (Utah 1986).
292. In re Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-903, 635 P.2d at 187; In re
Baby Child, 700 P.2d at 200; In re Halloway, 732 P.2d at 970-71.
293. In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-8287, 828 P.2d 1245,
1251 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); In re Robert T., 246 Cal. Rptr. 168, 174 (Cal. Ct.

App. 1988).
294. Guidelines, supra note 52, at 67,594.
295. Id. at 67,584 (conceding that the Guidelines "are not published as
regulations because they are not intended to have binding legislative effect").

296.

See In re F.H., 851 P.2d 1361, 1363-64 (Alaska 1993); In reJ.R.H., 358

N.W.2d 311, 321-22 (Iowa 1984); In re S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d 872, 879-80 (Minn.

Ct. App. 1993), revd on other grounds, 521 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 935 (1995); In re M., 832 P.2d 518, 522 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
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example, some courts have also considered factors such as "the
best interests of the child, the wishes of the biological parents,..
•the child's ties to the tribe,"29 7 the child's need for stability,"'
the child's bonds to the foster parent or preadoptive family," 9
and "the child's ability to make any cultural adjustments necessitated by a particular placement. "s° Other courts reject these
factors.3 0°
Although the Guidelines clearly state that good cause not to
follow the order of preference dictated in section 1915 may be
based on parental preference, courts hesitate to find good cause
based solely on parental preference. For example, in In re
F.H.,3 °2 the mother made it clear that she wanted a non-Indian
couple to adopt her child, not a member of her tribe. 0 3 Despite
this fact, the court found it necessary to list three other reasons
that good cause had been established as if to say the mother's
preference was not enough.3 0 4 The court even went so far as to
say that "[g]iven the possibility of a placement with a relative in
°
[the tribe], this case presented a close question." 305
A "good cause" determination depends more on the court
deciding the case than it does on the facts of the case. Until
Congress defines "good cause" or adopts the Guidelines' definition as law, courts will be free to determine "good cause" based
on anything they perceive to be relevant. Such a result is an
injustice to all involved.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

The ICWA was enacted to
families and tribes. The ICWA
which it was enacted. Worse, it
two groups of people: parents
297.

prevent the breakup of Indian
is not serving the purpose for
is infringing upon the rights of
of Indian children and abused

In re F.H., 851 P.2d at 1363-64.

298. In re S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 358.
299. In re T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298 (Ind. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1069
(1989); In re C.W., 479 N.W.2d 105, 117 (Neb. 1992) ("[T]ransfer to the tribe
and the inevitable grief over losing their psychological parents would
compromise the children's ability to benefit from that culture ...
.
300. In re M., 832 P.2d at 522.
301. In re S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 362 ("[A] finding of good cause cannot
be based simply on a determination that placement outside the preferences
would be in the child's best interest.").
302. 851 P.2d 1361, 1365 (Alaska 1993).
303. Id.
304. Id. The Alaska Supreme Court repeated this act in 1994 when both
the child and the mother clearly expressed their preference for a non-Indian to
adopt the child. In re N.P.S., 868 P.2d 934, 937-39 (Alaska 1994).
305. In re F.H., 851 P.2d at 1365.
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and neglected Indian children. Although the preference given
to tribes in the ICWA may be reasonably and rationally designed
to promote tribal self-government, it does not excuse the violations of personal protections. Until the Supreme Court rules on
this issue, however, the equal protection violations will continue.
Even if the Court were to find that the ICWA is constitutional,
more law is needed to ensure that it is being applied consistently
in every state.
As it stands, the outcome of a case involving an "Indian
child" depends not on the facts of the case, but rather the state in
which the case is being heard. Several states refuse to apply the
ICWA when there is not an "existing Indian family." States also
determine when the right to revoke voluntary consent to an
adoption ends, by considering state law instead of federal law.
Furthermore, a state's determination of who is an "Indian" does
not rely on the ICWA, but on factors adopted in each state.
Finally, all states create their own definitions of "good cause."
Such inconsistent application of the ICWA is not beneficial to
tribes, parents, or children and should be stopped.
Several things can be done to ensure that the goals of the
ICWA are achieved and at the same time all persons' rights are
respected. First, Congress should enact an amendment which
requires the ICWA only be applied to those children who are
part of an existing Indian family. Such an amendment would do
two things. First, it would ensure that parents of children with
Indian blood do not have their constitutional rights violated.
Second, it would ensure that the heightened standard of proof is
only applied to those children who are living on a reservation or
in a traditional Indian home.
Congress could also improve the ICWA by amending section
1915(a), which provides that adoptive placement preferences
apply to all adoption proceedings involving an Indian child."0 6
Section 1915(a) could be strengthened by amending it so that it
would only apply in two situations. First, it should apply to all
adoption proceedings where the child has been removed by the
state from an existing Indian family. Second, it should apply
whenever a parent of an Indian child elects. Such an amendment would ensure that Congress' goals are met and guarantee
that parents who wish to choose adoptive parents outside the
ICWA's preferences have the right to so do. It would also remove
the parental anonymity problems.
Congress could further enhance the ICWA by enacting the
part of the Guidelines that deals with methods of determining
306. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1994).
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tribal membership. 30 7 By making the Guidelines law, Congress
could ensure that all courts are respecting a given tribe's method
of keeping track of their members. This would in turn secure
equal treatment regardless of the state court hearing the case.
Finally, Congress could ameliorate the ICWA by providing a
specific list of what does and does not constitute "good cause to
the contrary 130 and what standard of proof should be used when
making such a determination. Such a list would, of course, not
be exhaustive, but would provide a good basis for ensuring that
courts are addressing similar issues in a consistent manner.
Thus, parents of children with Indian blood would not need to
guess as to how their state court would react to a given set of
facts.
As it currently stands, the ICWA is not having the impact
Congress desired. 3 9 This is likely to continue until Congressional amendments or Supreme Court interpretation is given.
Thus, action is needed not only to achieve Congressional goals
but, more importantly, to ensure its constitutionality.

307. Guidelines, supra note 52, at 67,586.
308. "Good cause to the contrary" is used in 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911(b),
1915(a)-(b) (1994), of the ICWA.
309. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.

